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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
termination of the economic desirability of fair -trade legislation is a mat-
ter which addresses itself to the state legislatures and to Congress, and
not to the courts.
BAny M. BYRON
Last Clear Chance in Ohio-Derogation of
Contributory Negligence*
INTRODUCTION
Contributory negligence, once praised as he doctrine of reason and
justice, was recently described as the harshest doctrine known to the 19th
century.1 A distastefully gross quality inheres in a rationale which demes
any compensation to an injured party while exonerating an admittedly
negligent defendant. The austerity of this rule, however, is commonly
modified by the application of the doctrine of last clear chance. Even
though a plaintiff may have violated the duty imposed upon all men to ob-
serve ordinary care for his own safety, the last clear chance doctrine allows
him to recover for his injuries. The usual explanation of the doctrine is
that the plaintiff may recover in spite of his own fault if the defendant had,
but failed to seize, the "last clear chance" to prevent the accident.2
In an early Ohio case,3 the supreme court remarked that contributory
negligence rested upon no doctrinal basis, but rather upon the policy of
making the personal interest of parties dependent upon their own care and
prudence.4 The doctrine of last clear chance also rests upon a hidden policy
of the law - a policy which is more concerned with social effects than
personal prudence.
The manner in which courts inject this policy into the law deserves at-
tention. The typical last clear chance situation is one of multiple fault:
both plaintiff and defendant negligently contribute to the impact. In such
a situation, courts commonly place responsibility for the loss by finding
one party's fault to be the proximate, immediate, later or responsible "cause"
of the impact.
Judgments of causality, however, are intimately dependent upon value
standards.5 Causal relationships are seen through a highly selective screen
* This note received second prize in the 1956 Sindell Tort Competition, awarded by
Sindell, Sindell and Bourne.
L GREEN, JuDGE AND JURY 115 (1930).
2 PROSSER, TORTS 290 (2d ed. 1955).
"Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470 (1887)
'Id. at 489.
5 Cohen, F. S., Field Theory and Judicfal Logsc, 59 YALE L. J. 238, 253 (1950).
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of human values which give more importance to some antecedents than to
others. Thus, despite the fact that an impact has only one set of physical
antecedents, different jurisdictions, and different judges in the same juris-
diction, may differ on the question of which factor was the responsible
"cause." Last dear chance operates as an instrument by which courts may
label some antecedents "proximate" or "responsible" factors and other ante-
cedents "remote."
The purpose of this note is to analyze the last clear chance doctrine,
to trace its development and use in Ohio law, to note relevant factors which
seem to influence judgments of causality in particular cases, and to appraise
the usefulness of such a doctrine in our system of law.
DocjNE AND CRITIQUE
Negligence is founded, in part, upon morality. Fault -is the first step
to a defendant's legal liability. Contributory negligence, itself a counter-
vailing morality, accentuates the element of causation in the determination
of responsibility for loss. A distinguished English Jurist once said,
Contributory negligence in a plaintiff only means that he himself has
contributed to the accident in such a sense as to render the defendant's
breach of duty no longer its proximate cause.'
Last clear chance extends fault to the third degree by withholding the
defense of contributory negligence in situations where the defendant fails to
avail himself of the last opportumty to prevent loss.
Last clear chance originated in the celebrated Exchequer case of Davws v.
Mann.7 Plaintiff left his ass fettered on the highway. Defendant's team of
horses, coming at what witness termed a "smarish pace," knocked the ass
down and drove over it. The animal died soon after. The court held that
the plaintiff might recover, even though negligent, if the accident might
have been avoided by the exercise of proper conduct on the part of the
defendant. Baron Parke said,
Although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defendant
was bound to go along the road at such a pace as to avoid the injury
the mere fact of negligence on the part of the plaintiff was no answer
to the action unless the donkey's being there was the immediate cause of
the injury. (Emphasis added.)'
This decision stressed the subsequent negligence of the defendant while
the ass was in helpless peril. This emphasis upon the time factor indicates
that the decision was based upon the "last human wrongdoer" theory.
Thus, the foundation was laid for a doctrine which stressed -the later fault.
'Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 694 (1887).
S10 M. & W 545 (1842).
'Id. at 548.
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Last dear chance was met with bitter criticism by American text writers.9
They foresaw a virtual nullification of -the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. Although the criticism, often condemnation, has continued to this
day, virtually every jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine in some guise-"
To meet the facts of particular cases, courts have extended, restricted and
varied its application. As a result of this varied application, last clear
chance has become a label applied in different jurisdictions to different
rules of law.
In order to understand how last clear chance functions, it is useful to
analyze -the typical last clear chance situation. 1
Plaintiff, whose thoughts are a million miles away, wanders down a
path which crosses a railroad track. A train is approaching. Plaintiff is
about to enter and pass slowly through a zone of danger. Unless plaintiff
realizes his danger, collision will be inevitable if the defendant fails to
brake the train before a certain critical point on the track is reached. After
-that point is passed, even though the brakes be applied, the train would
pass over the point upon which plaintiff is positioned. Even after the critical
point is passed, plaintiff will have an opportunity in time and space to
jump clear of the zone of danger if he realizes hlis peril. The engineer
sees the plaintiff, but he fails to brake until after the crucial point is passed.
Plaintiff fails to realize his position of peril. He is struck and seriously
anjured, perhaps fatally. Who had the last clear chance to avoid this acci-
dent? Specific questions of fact must first be answered. Was the plaintiff
helpless or merely inattentive? Could plaintiff extricate himself from peril
after defendant passed the critical point? Did the defendant have actual
knowledge of plaintiff's peril, or should he have had such knowledge by the
exercise of due care? When the defendant discovered plaintiff's peril, did
he have the means at hand to prevent the impact? Did defendant's antece-
dent negligence prevent his having a last clear chance or opportunity to
avoid the harm? Did the negligence of the plaintiff continue and concur
with that of the defendant? Depending upon the jury, jurisdiction and time,
the answers to these questions of fact will determine whether the defense of
contributory negligence will be denied the defendant on the ground that he
had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
'See Schofield, Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 -IARv. L. REv. 263 (1890).
This author thoroughly discusses the early attitude of courts and secondary writers
toward last clear chance.
" See Black v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 193 Mass. 448, 79 N.E. 797 (1907)
The doctrine of last clear chance is here repudiated, yet applied under the Massachu-
setts doctrine of cause and condition.
' See MoRRs, TORTs 221, 222 (1953) The author sets forth therein an excellent
analysis of the typical last dear chance situation. This article should be both a guide
and a starting point for understanding the problem of fact required to support a
petition or jury charge on the doctrine of last clear chance.
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Where the plaintiff is helpless to avoid the harm by reason of his prior
negligence, and the defendant discovers his peril in time to avoid it,
the majority of jurisdictions hold the defendant liable upon the doctrine
of discovered peril or conscious last clear chance.12
Where the plaintiff is helpless and in a position of Mextricable peril,
but the defendant does not discover the danger in time to avoid it, the
general rule is that the plaintiff may not recover even though the defendant
could have discovered plaintiff's peril by the exercise of due care.'3 The
courts hold that the defendant had no chance to avoid the harm.
In the leading case of Woloszynowskt v. The New York Central Rail-
road,14 a small boy went upon defendanes tracks. He stood -there in the
path of a train looking neither to the right nor the left. The fireman and
brakeman, who saw him, shouted a warning to the engineer. He immedi-
ately applied the brakes, without avail. In the action for wrongful death,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed a verdict for the plaintiff. Jus-
tice Cardozo said,
Knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence, in the face
even of profession of ignorance, but knowledge there must be or reckless-
ness so reckless as to betoken indifference to knowledge. The doctrine
of the last dear chance, however, is never wakened into action unless and
until there is brought home to the defendant to be charged with liability a
knowledge that another is in a state of present peril, in which event there
must be reasonable effort to counteract the peril and avert its conse-
quences."
A strong minority of jurisdictions do allow recovery in such a situa-
tion.'0 This rule is termed the doctrine of unconsctous last clear chance.
These jurisdictions submit that a plaintiff oblivious of his surroundings has
no more of an opportunity to escape than a man asleep or drunk. The
"no chance" jurisdictions reply with the argument that the defendant can
reasonably assume, until the last moment, that plaintiff will take care of
himself. These cases, however, are usually marked by a flagrant lack of rea-
soning. Courts state that the chance which was presented was not "dear,"
"Schaaf v. Coen, 131 Ohio St. 279, 2 N.E.2d 605 (1936); Bence v. Teddy's Tax,
112 Cal. App. 636, 297 Pac. 128 (1931).
' Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873 (1932).
14254 N.Y. 206, 172 N.E. 471 (1930). (This case is usually cited for the proposi-
tion that the danger must be actually discovered by the defendant. It should be
noted, however, that the plaintiff's decedent was not helpless, but was in a position
of extricable peril. There was a time when he could have jumped free had he realized
his dangerous position. Thus the case could be, though it has not been, limited to
instances of extricable peril.)
"Id. at 209, 172 N.E. at 472.
'-'Nicol v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & N. Co., 71 Wash. 409, 128 Pac. 628 (1912)
(this rule is also termed the "Washington Rule"); accord, Casey v. Marshall, 64
Ariz. 232, 168 P.2d 240 (1946); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 479 (1934).
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or that the negligence of the party which the court feels should be absolved
was remote, while that of the other was proximate.
These decisions are not so far distant in practice as they may seem in
theory. Knowledge may be determined by circumstantial evidence. It is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury. The defendant who had a
duty to lookout may well have a difficult time convincing a jury that he
did not, in fact, see the plaintiff. The defendant also faces another di-
lemma. If he pleads and testifies that he did not see the plaintiff, this ad-
mission of lack of due care will come hauntingly back should the jury fail
to find contributory negligence. The primary negligence of the defendant
will be apparent.
The majority of jurisdictions also recognize the application of last
clear chance where the plaintiff is merely inattentive, and the defendant dis-
covers his danger while he can still avoid it.17 This is based upon the
doctrine of conscious last clear chance.
If the inattentive defendant does not discover the plaintiff's inattention,
both have an equal opportunity to avoid the harm. All jurisdictions deny
the plaintiff recovery in this situation save Missouri.' 8 That state has
evolved what is termed the "humanitarian doctrine."' 9 Recovery is allowed
when the defendant is operating a dangerous mechanism such as a train
or automobile. As the vast majority of last dear chance situations do in-
volve such an instrumentality, the rule should apply in practice to all but
the most unusual cases. Its application has created such confusion that
no other jurisdiction has been tempted to follow it.20
If the defendanes antecedent negligence prevents his having the present
opportunity to avoid the harm, the general rule is that the defendant had
no chance.2'
The leading exception .to this general rule is the case of Brn'sh Co-
lumbha Ry. v. Loach.2 2 Sands, plaintiff's decedent, was a passenger in a
wagon approaching defendant's railroad crossing. When the car was ap-
'
TMerrill v. Stringer, 58 N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954); Girdner v. Union Oil
Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); REsATEMENT, ToRTs § 480 (1934).
'Thompson v. Porter, 21 Wash.2d 449, 151 P.2d 433 (1944); Iverson v. Knorr,
68 S.D. 23, 298 N.W 28 (1941).
" McCall v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 155 S.W.2d 161 (1941); Barrie v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 87, 76 S.W 706 (1903); Gaines, The Humarntarn
Doctrine so Missours, 20 ST. Louis L. 1V. 113 (1935).
'Cf. Capital Transit Co. v. Garcia, 194 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In this case
the Missouri result was reached saying the plaintiff was helpless because of his in-
attention.
'Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Conley's Adm'x, 261 Ky. 669, 88 S.W.2d 683
(1935); Johnson v. Director General of Railroads, 81 N.H. 289, 125 At. 147
(1924); Illinois Central Ry. v. Nelson, 173 Fed. 915 (8th Cir. 1909).
n (1916) A.C. 719 (P.C.).
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proximately 400 feet away, the motorman apprecated the danger and ap-
plied the brakes. Had the brakes been in good condition, the car would
have stopped in 100 feet. In fact, the brakes were defective. The train
could not be stopped until well past the crossing. Sands was killed in the
collision. In the trial court, a verdict was given for the plaintiff. The
Privy Council of England dismissed defendant's appeal upon the ground
that a last opportunity, which he would have had but for his own antecedent
negligence, was equivalent to one actually had. In the instant case, plaintiff
continued to act unreasonably after the defendanes servant .had started to
act reasonably. Surely, the later fault belonged to the plaintiff. Yet, lia-
bility was predicated upon the doctrine of last opportunity. When courts
use causal relation judgments to support objectives, verbal legerdemain is
not uncommon.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN OHIO
In 1854, the first case involving the elements of last clear chance reached
the Ohio Supreme Court-Kerwacker v. Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincm-
nat: Railroad.23 Farmer Kerwacker's pigs wandered into the path of de-
fendant's locomotive, were run over and killed. The issue before the court
was whether defendant had exercised due care to avoid the injury. Because
due care on the part of the railroad would have avoided the harm, recovery
was allowed. The negligence of the defendant was termed "proximate,"
while that of the plaintiff was labeled "remote."
Despite the Kerwacker case, Raihoad Co. v. Kassen2 4 is usually cited as
being the case which introduced last clear chance into Ohio jurisprudence.
Defendant operated a tram which ran in two sections, two hours apart. De-
cedent negligently stepped from the first -train and fell unconscious upon
defendant's tracks. Defendant's servants on the first section had actual
knowledge of plaintiff's decedent's peril. The second section ran hun over.
The Ohio Supreme Court imputed the knowledge of the brakeman on the
first section to the engineer of the second, and proceeded to allow recovery.
The negligence of the defendant was pronounced to be the more proxzmaate
cause of the harm. Unfortunately, the opinion included language broader
than the decision. Although the court had imputed actual knowledge to
the engineer of the second section it went on to say that the plaintiff
could recover if the defendant had been aware or ought to have been aware
of the plaintiff's danger. Inteipreted literally, -this language would allow a
recovery upon the doctrine of unconscious last clear chance. This dictum
was later repudiated, but the holding definitely committed Ohio to the
'3 Ohio St. 172 (1854).
" 49 Ouo St. 230, 31 N.E. 282 (1892).
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theory that last dear chance is a part of the doctrine of proximate cause,
rather than an extension of contributory negligence.
A distinguished authority on the subject of legal cause has submitted
that the rules of legal cause are applied to produce a just resut, rather than
to save time or avoid uncertainty.2 5 Through the years, the Ohio Supreme
Court has applied .the rules of legal cause through the doctrine of last dear
chance. The following cases trace the development of the doctrine and
illustrate some factors which affected the judicial decisions then and, per-
haps, now.
In Drown v. Northern Ohi 2racton Co.,26 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of last clear chance was logically irreconcilable with
the doctrine of contributory negligence, and that the basis for the doctrine
was the distinction between a proximate and a remote cause. Perhaps the
language of the court can better describe the attitude of the judge who wrote
this decision. He wrote,
In short, there can be no recovery in such a case unless the whole doc-
trine of contributory negligence, a doctrine founded in reason and justice,
should be abolished. It is dear that the last dear chance rule should
be given with discriminationY
Pennsylvania Co. v. Hart28 established the doctrine of concurrent negli-
gence as a corollary to the doctrine of last dear chance. The doctrine of
concurrent negligence postulates that last clear chance is not an extension of
the doctrine of comparative negligence; therefore, a plaintiff's negligence
must cease before impact or the last dear chance will be said to be his. In
situations of extricable peril occasioned by plaintiff's inadvertence to im-
pending danger, this continuing negligence which will eventually concur
with that of the defendant precludes recovery by the plaintiff.
In West v. Gillette,9 the trial court inadvertently charged the jury that
the plaintiff could recover if the defendant "  ought to have seen" the
plaintiff. A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court held the charge, even if
erroneous, would not preclude recovery, for the evidence showed actual
knowledge. Commenting on contributory negligence, Judge Johnson said,
it would surely be unjust to hold that one should be denied the pro-
tection of the law, because of acts of carelessness on his part, which were
followed by subsequent acts of negligence on the part of another, which
latter acts were the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis added.)'
'Edgerton, Legal Camse, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924)
176 Ohio St. 234, 81 N.E. 326 (1907).
M Id. at 246, 249, 81 N.E. at 328, 329.
' 101 Oho St 196, 128 N.E. 142 (1920)
195 Ohio St. 305, 116 N.E. 521 (1917)
"OId. at 311, 116 N.E. at 522.
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It is interesting to note that Judge Johnson compared the carelessness of
the plaintiff to the negligence of the defendant in arriving at the conclusion
that the negligence of the defendant was the proxsmate cause of the impact.
Compare this conclusion with the dissent where Judge Jones said,
By the charge in this case, the doctrine of contributory negligence,
long recognized in this state, has been emasculated, since the charge permits
recovery by a negligent person even though that negligence concurred in
and was a proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis added.)"
These excerpts serve to illustrate some of the factors which influenced
two learned judges to differ on which of two fault factors was the proximate
cause of an impact. Justice Cardozo once wrote,
There is nothing absolute in the legal estimate of causation. Proxim-
ity and remoteness are relative and changing concepts.'
Indeed, valuations of proximity and remoteness are relative to judge
and jurisdiction, and legal estimates of causation do change with the passage
of time. The conservative views expressed by Judge Jones for the minority
in West v. Gillette33 were later to take root in majority opinions of the
Ohio Supreme Court. This judge, who feared last dear chance would
emasculate the doctrine of contributory negligence, was the author of the
majority opinions in both Cleveland Railway v. Wendt,34 and Cleveland
Railway v. Masterson,"5 the leading last clear chance case in Ohio. In both
cases, judgments -for the plaintiff were reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court.
In -the Masterson case, plaintiff, while jaywalking, was struck by an
auto and thrown into the devils strip on defendant's track. He was struck
by an oncoming street car. The plaintiff pleaded and the trial judge charged
the jury that recovery could be had by the plaintiff if the defendant saw,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have seen the plaintiff, and could
have stopped the street car in time to avoid striking him. The Ohio Su-
preme Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff holding the instruction
to be reversible error. Judge Jones delivered the majority opinion. The
court held that a defendant is required to use due care only after knowledge
of a plaintiff's peril. This decision definitely placed Ohio among the
conservative "discovered peril" jurisdictions.
That so extreme a case as Fai'port, Painesville, and Eastern R.R. v.
Meredith36 managed its way into Ohio law is astonishing. Plaintiff and her
"Id. at 326, 116 NE. at 526.
2CARDOzo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 85 (1927).
"95 Ohio St. 305, 326, 116 N.E. 521, 526 (1917).
u120 Ohio St. 197, 165 N.E. 737 (1929).
"126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873 (1932). This case is universally cited as a leading
case requiring discovered peril.
"46 Ohio App. 457, 189 N.E. 10 (1933); af 'd, 292 U.S. 589 (1934). The Ohio
Supreme Court refused to take up the case.
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daughter negligently drove upon defendant's railroad crossing. They did
not observe the approaching train, running backward, which consisted of
32 cars. Although the engine, -tender, and all other cars were equipped with
air brakes, the connection required by federal statute had not been made.
Neither defendant nor plaintiff knew of the approach of the other until
immediately prior to -the impact. There was no dispute that, from the in-
stant of collision until the auto dropped from the tender, the car had
traveled 657 feet from the crossing. When the train finally stopped, the
auto was beneath the wheels of the tender. The occupants of the car had
received no serious injury until the car was crushed beneath the tender. Had
the air brakes been connected, the train could have stopped more quickly
and serious harm would have been averted. In the trial court; a jury returned
a verdict of $20,000 for the plaintiff. This squarely raised the issue of
whether pre-existing negligence may be considered in determimng re-
sponsibility under the doctrine of last clear chance. Against the over-
whelming weight of authority,37 citing only one obscure Utah case3 8 in
support, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the verdict. The
Ohio Supreme Court judiciously declined to review the action of the court
of appeals.
The Meredith case reveals much of the judicial attitude toward last dear
chance. The opinion read,
In the instant case, at most, the plaintiff violated no rule except the
natural law to use ordinary care for her own protection, and the defendant
violated a federal law.
Although proximate cause may be the cornerstone of the Ohio doctrine of
last clear chance, the court of appeals seemed to emphasiz greater rather
than later fault. In a jurisdiction which is emphatically committed to the
proposition that last clear chance has nothing to do with the doctrine of
comparative negligence, a jursdiction whose highest court once hailed con-
tributory negligence as the doctrine of reason and justice, this decision stands
alone. It has never been followed.
SUMMARY OF THE OHIo DoCTRINE
The battleground of last clear chance is the trial court. The fact situa-
tions to which the doctrine may be properly applied have been defined by
appellate cases. Its application is dependent upon questions of fact in
each particular case.
The defendant must have actual knowledge of plaintiff's peril. The
See note 19 supra.
"sThompson v. Salt Lake Rapid-Transit, 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92 (1898).
"Meredith v. Fairport, P. & E. R.., 46 Ohio App. 457, 468, 189 N.E. 10, 14
(1933); aft'd, 292 U.S. 589 (1934).
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negligence of plaintiff must have ceased before the impact. If the negli-
gence of the plaintiff continues and concurs with that of the defendant,
plaintiff will be denied recovery. These questions are questions of fact to
be determined by the jury, unless reasonable men could not disagree. There
is slight authority that a defendant's antecedent negligence with actual
knowledge of plaintiff's peril will render him liable.
Throughout the leading cases m Ohio on last clear chance runs a com-
mon thread, the proposition that last clear chance is but an application of
the principles of law relating to proximate cause.
SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSION
Last clear chance is more than one rule. It is a conglomeration of many
different rules, each applied under the same label Practically every possible
rule has been developed, even in the same jurisdiction.40
The "lase, in the doctrine is directly related to the "proximate" in
proximate cause. Both wor& bear connotation of a tme factor. Many
times the question of later fault is the decisive factor in determining re-
sponsibility. Yet, it is submitted that courts, and certainly juries, often
search for the greater blameworthiness. Although the courts of Ohio are
committed to the ater, rather than the greater, fault theory, comments which
bespeak a recognition of greater fault have crept into the opinions.
Logically a party who is to blame for an accident ought to bear only
that part of the loss for which he is responsible. But last clear chance has
functioned as an instrument by which courts place sole responsibility for
loss upon a single party when both parties are at fault. Thus, instead of
mitigating -the harshness of contributory negligence, this doctrine merely
shifts the responsibility for loss. The inflexibility of both contributory
negligence and last clear chance points out the inadequacies in the present
Monte Carlo system of "winner take alL" These inadequacies have
prompted contemporary legal scholars to advance alternative solutions.
One alternative employed by some jurisdictions is a statutory rule of
apportionment, which is clearly based upon the concept of fault. Under
such "comparative negligence' statutes, however, the loss is still borne by
the immediate parties, who very often can il afford to incur such a loss.
These considerations may lead to a future system of law based upon "social
fault," rather than the current notion of personal blameworthiness.
Legal concepts, to a certain degree, reflect the mores of the contempo-
rary societies from which they evolve. Modern society is highly mechanized,
'See Demuth, Derogation of The Common Law Rule of Contributory Negligence,
7 RoCKY MT. L. Rav. 161 (1935). The author sets forth therein an excellent
chart of reaction of Colorado courts to the various fact situations in which last clear
chance was considered.
19561
